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3
Limits to Economic Forecasting
Kajal Lahiri
University at Albany, State University of New York
Economic forecasting is not a very reputable profession. There 
is skepticism not only by laymen but by most academic economists 
regarding the true capability of macroeconomic forecasters. The con-
ventional wisdom is that economic forecasters are mere charlatans. 
However, there are numerous reasons why economic forecasts are 
so hard to get right. Not only do we not understand the continuously 
changing economic processes that generate the variable we want to 
predict, but we do not always have the appropriate measurements to 
identify the effects of sudden structural breaks that are due to economic 
and noneconomic factors. One way to make forecasts more useful—
though not necessarily more accurate—might be to follow the “truth 
in labeling” often used in the marketing of many products. By this I 
mean every forecast should come with the associate expected errors 
like forecast uncertainty, so that both the forecasters and their clients 
would know what level of confi dence to place in a forecast. This aspect 
of any forecast should be communicated, in addition to the forecasts 
themselves. Makridakis, Hogarth, and Gaba (2009) forcefully make 
the point that not having a proper estimate of the underlying uncer-
tainty means succumbing to the illusion of control and experiencing 
surprises, often with negative consequences. It is in this spirit that since 
the mid-1990s the Bank of England and Sveriges Riksbank of Sweden 
have been reporting fan charts that show subjective confi dence bands 
surrounding offi cial forecasts. Since November 2007, each member of 
the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has also been pub-
lishing information about uncertainty associated with that committee’s 
economic outlooks. As Granger (1996) points out, in many disciplines 
there seem to be horizons beyond which useful forecasting is not pos-
sible; for instance, in weather forecasting it is four or fi ve days. An 
essential element of forecasting is to extract useful signals from noisy 
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data, and to project them into the future. Certainly, an aspect that pro-
vides limits to how far ahead one can forecast is when the forecastable 
signals get lost in the noise. It would also be helpful to be aware of these 
kinds of limits to economic forecasting in cases where the underlying 
uncertainty is hopelessly high. 
Against this backdrop, in this chapter I will evaluate the capabil-
ity of a large number of professional forecasters to forecast real GDP 
growth at different horizons and will determine how far ahead they can 
really forecast. The advantage of analyzing the predictions made by a 
large number of professional forecasters is that abrupt structural and 
policy changes that are hard to pick up by estimated forecasting models 
can possibly be incorporated into the subjective judgments of experts. 
There seems to be a widely held expectation that the economy can be 
forecast over a typical business cycle, which is about fi ve to seven years 
long. I will contrast two types of forecasts: 1) the actual growth rate and 
2) whether the growth will be negative in some specifi ed quarter in the 
future. I fi nd that forecasts for the actual GDP growth do not have much 
value when the horizon goes beyond 18 months. However, the probabil-
ity forecasts for negative GDP growth have no value when the horizon 
exceeds six months. I explore reasons why the directional probability 
forecasts perform worse than the quantitative real GDP forecasts. 
INFORMATION CONTENT OF REAL GDP FORECASTS
In this section I analyze the quantitative forecasts using 15 years 
of monthly private-sector forecast data for 18 developed countries, 
reported over 24 different forecast horizons. The real GDP forecasts 
come from Consensus Economics Inc., an international economic 
survey organization. Since October 1989, Consensus Economics Inc. 
has been polling more than 600 forecasters each month and recording 
their forecasts for principal macroeconomic variables (including GDP 
growth, infl ation, interest rates, and exchange rates) for a large number 
of countries. Forecasts are made for the current year (based on par-
tial information about developments in that year) and for the following 
year. The number of forecasters ranges from 10 to 30 for most of the 
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countries, and for the major industrialized countries the panelists are 
based in the countries for which they forecast. 
We study the consensus forecasts of average annual real GDP 
growth. Survey respondents make their fi rst forecasts when there are 24 
months to the end of the year being forecast; that is, they start forecast-
ing GDP growth in January of the previous year, and their last monthly 
forecast is reported at the beginning of December of the target year, 
23 months later. So for each country and for each target year I have 24 
forecasts of varying horizons. Our data set ranges from October 1989 
to June 2004. The countries we study are the 18 industrialized countries 
for which forecasts are available from Consensus Economics Inc.1 
In order to evaluate the forecast errors correctly, the forecasts should 
be matched with the actual data being forecast. It is well documented 
in the literature that data revisions may have an important impact on 
the perceived performance of the forecasters. Since forecasters cannot 
possibly be aware of data revisions after they report their forecasts, we 
use an early revision as the actual value, which is compiled from the 
midyear reports of the issue of OECD Economic Outlook immediately 
following the target year. However, because of the changes in variable 
defi nitions (i.e., GNP to GDP, or West Germany to unifi ed Germany), 
some of the data are not available in the June issue of OECD Economic 
Outlook. We collected these data from the original sources, such as the 
May and June issues of the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s Survey of 
Business, or issues of Deutsche Bundesbank’s Monthly Report in the 
year immediately following the target year.
The information value of a forecast is related to how accurate the 
forecast is. In this section, we will provide statistics such as mean squared 
error (MSE), mean absolute error (MAE), and Theil’s U-statistic, 
along with another statistic recently proposed by Diebold and Kilian 
(2001). Whereas MSE and MAE depend on the variability of the actual 
process, Theil’s U-statistic scales the root mean square error (RMSE) 
by the variability of underlying data and has the advantage of being 
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Equation (3.1) compares the forecast errors with a naive forecast, yn . If 
Uh is more than one, the forecast does not beat the naive forecast. An 
important issue in calculating the Uh is the selection of the naive fore-
cast. In this study, we will follow the literature and use the forecast of 
no change as the naive forecast, i.e., 1n ty y  .
To see the improvement in the performance of forecasts over 
decreasing horizons, we also provide an R2 measure, which is based 
on the idea of a predictability measure proposed by Diebold and Kilian 












  , 
where  ( )kE L e  denotes the expected loss in the long-run forecasts and 
 ( )sE L e  denotes the expected loss in the short-run forecasts. If MSE 
is used as the loss function, then we have 





Diebold and Kilian (2001) use this measure to compute the pre-
dictability of several macro variables using the realized data. Using 
k-period-ahead survey forecasts as the naive forecast, ps,k will give the 
improvement in the forecasts as horizon decreases. 
Table 3.1 presents MAE, MSE, and Theil’s U-statistics for 12- and 
24-month-ahead forecasts. Later we also provide the Theil’s U-statistics 
for all horizons. For 24-month-ahead forecasts, Theil’s U-statistic is less 
than one for only Canada, Denmark, Germany, and the United States. 
The worst performers in 24-month-ahead forecasts are Portugal, Ire-
land, and the Netherlands, which have Theil’s U-statistics of 1.45, 1.41, 
and 1.39, respectively. For 12-month-ahead forecasts, all the countries, 
with the exception of Ireland and Portugal, have Theil’s U-statistics of 
less than one, implying that the forecasts have value over the no-change 
forecast.
Figure 3.1 presents Diebold and Kilian’s ph,24 and Theil’s 1( )h tU y   
for each forecast horizon and country. Notice that large values of 
Theil’s U imply large forecast errors. On the other hand, large values 
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of ph,24 imply that forecasts improve signifi cantly over the 24-month-
ahead forecast ,24tf . The right axes in the fi gures show ph,24 , whereas the 
left axes show the values of 1( )h tU y  . Since 1.0 is the threshold value 
of 1( )h tU y  for determining whether the forecast can beat the naive 
forecast of no change, the plots in Figure 3.1 include a horizontal line 
through 1.0. In addition, to pinpoint the longest horizon at which the 
forecasts beat the naive forecast, the graphs also include a vertical line 
through the longest horizon at which the estimated 1( )h tU y   is lower 
than one. This provides an easy way to compare the countries with each 
other. For all the countries, as the forecast horizon decreases, the qual-
ity of the forecasts increases, as expected. The graphs also point out 
signifi cant heterogeneity across countries.
When we look at the performance rankings based on Theil’s 
1( )h tU y  , we observe that in addition to the four country forecasts that 
T able 3.1  Goodness of Fit of Forecasts (MAE, RMSE, and Theil’s U)
12-month-ahead forecasts  24-month-ahead forecasts
Country MAE RMSE Theil’s U MAE RMSE Theil’s U
Austria 0.98 1.16 0.81 1.24 1.48 1.01
Belgium 0.99 1.15 0.72 1.28 1.68 1.02
Canada 1.21 1.36 0.70 1.44 1.70 0.88
Denmark 0.72 0.99 0.75 0.96 1.14 0.84
Finland 2.24 2.89 0.87 2.70 3.37 1.07
France 0.79 0.99 0.73 1.15 1.50 1.08
Germany 0.79 1.03 0.60 1.49 1.96 0.99
Ireland 2.35 2.76 1.08 2.98 3.67 1.41
Italy 0.77 0.87 0.65 1.39 1.61 1.19
Japan 1.41 1.58 0.74 1.90 2.30 1.04
Netherlands 0.89 1.06 0.88 1.38 1.72 1.39
Norway 0.92 1.13 0.73 1.14 1.33 1.00
Portugal 0.98 1.31 1.02 1.40 1.89 1.45
Spain 0.61 0.86 0.66 1.18 1.58 1.20
Sweden 0.90 1.13 0.69 1.46 1.84 1.13
Switzerland 1.22 1.45 0.92 1.71 2.04 1.26
United Kingdom 0.77 1.02 0.70 1.08 1.62 1.12
United States 0.96 1.09 0.64 1.28 1.59 0.96
SOURCE: Author’s own research.
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Figure 3.1 Information Content of Forecasts over Horizons, October 
1989–June 2004
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Figure 3.1  (continued)     
NOTE: U(h) = Theil’s U; P(h,24) = Diebold-Kilian predictability statistic.
SOURCE: Author’s analysis of data from the SPF.
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beat the naive forecast when horizon is 24 months (i.e., the American, 
Danish, German, and Canadian forecasts given in Table 3.1), we now 
see that Austrian and Norwegian forecasts beat the naive forecast when 
the horizon is 23 months. In terms of the worst performances in beating 
the naive forecast, we fi nd that the Irish and Portuguese forecasts beat 
the naive forecast at horizons of 10 and 11 months, respectively. These 
are followed by Switzerland and the Netherlands, which beat the naive 
forecast when the horizon is 13 months.
The Diebold-Kilian measure of predictability, ph,24 , shows the 
improvement in the information content of the forecasts as measured by 
the decrease in the mean squared errors over the MSE of the 24-month-
ahead forecasts. As shown in Figure 3.1, the predictive ability of GDP 
forecasts for some countries (e.g., France, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
Japan, and the United States) does not improve over the 24-month-
ahead forecasts when the horizon is relatively long, but for some other 
countries (e.g., Germany, Ireland, and Spain), each additional month 
increases the information content of the forecasts over the previous 
month, even in longer-run forecasts. For most of the countries, we see 
that MSE substantially decreases in the short-run forecasts, causing ph,24 
to be close to 100 percent when the forecast horizon is one month. Two 
exceptions are the Norwegian and Irish GDP growth forecasts, where 
the fi nal values of ph,24 are less than 80 percent. 
EXPLORING THE DATA-GENERATING PROCESSES
We fi nd that, historically, real GDP has been a diffi cult variable to 
predict beyond 24 months at the maximum. One might think that this 
can be attributed to the variability of the underlying series. However, it 
is not the variability but rather the predictability of the target variable 
that is one of the important factors in the analysis. This is the focus of 
this section.
Following Galbraith (2003) and Galbraith and Tkacz (2007), we 
calculate the forecast content and content horizons for the quarterly 
GDP growth rate for all seven countries in our sample over the period 
1990–2007. The forecast content is defi ned as the proportionate gain 
in the MSE from the best-fi tting autoregressive model over the uncon-
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ditional mean of the series as the benchmark. The forecast content 
horizon is defi ned as the horizon beyond which the forecast content is 
close to zero. Galbraith (2003) has characterized the content function of 
AR(p) models analytically, taking into account the uncertainty associ-
ated with parameter estimation. We allow p to be no greater than 4 for 
quarterly GDP data. The value of p is chosen by the Schwarz informa-
tion criterion, using an upper bound. The benchmark values were the 
unconditional means of the individual series during 1990–2007. All the 
data used in this section are downloaded from Datastream, a fi nancial 
statistical database from Thomson Reuters.
The results of the estimation of forecast content functions for seven 
industrialized countries are presented in Figure 3.2. For annual GDP 
growth using quarterly data, the forecast content becomes less than 0.05 
when the horizon exceeds six quarters. These fi ndings are consistent 
Figure 3.2  Real GDP Predictability Based on AR(p) Models 
 (quarterly horizons)
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with the results reported in Galbraith (2003), who has looked at the 
predictability of GDP and infl ation for Canada and the United States. 
We should point out that our forecast content functions are based 
purely on linear autoregressive models of the target variables. In real-
ity, forecast content and predictability can be and possibly are improved 
upon by incorporating additional information and using more compli-
cated models.2 In addition, the forecast content functions are typically 
estimated using currently available revised data. For variables like real 
GDP that go through a substantial amount of data revision, their predict-
ability in real time can be quite different. Since the variance of the early 
revisions of a variable is necessarily less than that of the revised series, 
the predictability of a series may seem to be less attractive than what 
one may get using real-time data. In that sense, the forecast content 
from the simple AR model provides an overall lower bound on the true 
predictability of a series. For real GDP, Croushore (2006) reports mixed 
evidence as to the effect of data revisions on predictability, depending 
on the sample period. Since data revisions are relatively small for infl a-
tion, they have very little effect on predictability. In our analysis, the 
relative ranking of different countries in terms of RMSE does not match 
the relative ranking of those countries in terms of forecast content hori-
zons that one obtains from Galbraith’s method for the variable. The 
ranking can also depend on the specifi c benchmark used in the analysis. 
Thus it is necessary to study the predictability of real GDP by profes-
sional forecasters in real time with respect to a more natural benchmark. 
EVALUATING PROBABILITY FORECASTS FOR REAL 
GDP DECLINES 
In this section I report on the value of the subjective probability 
forecasts that are obtained from the SPF as predictors of GDP down-
turns. Even though these forecasts have been available since 1968 and 
have drawn media attention, very little systematic analysis has been 
conducted to look into their usefulness as possible business cycle 
indicators.3 
One purpose of this section is to illustrate that an evaluation of 
recorded probability forecasts by professional economists can suggest 
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reasons for forecasting failures and can help defi ne limits to the current 
capability of macroeconomic forecasts. The traditional and the most 
popular way of evaluating probability forecasts is the MSE type of mea-
sure, such as Brier’s quadratic probability score (QPS), which evaluates 
the external correspondence between the probability forecasts and the 
realization of the event. This approach, however, can fail to identify the 
ability of a forecasting system to evaluate the odds of the occurrence of 
an event against its nonoccurrence, which is a very important character-
istic to the users of forecasts. A high performance score can be achieved 
by totally unskilled forecasts having little information value. Thus, the 
traditional approach can be inadequate in evaluating the usefulness of 
probability forecasts, particularly for rare events.4
The SPF has been collecting subjective probability forecasts of 
real GDP/GNP declines during the current and four subsequent quar-
ters since its inception in 1968.5 At the end of the fi rst month of each 
quarter, the individual forecasters in the SPF form their forecasts. The 
survey collects probability assessments for a decline in real GDP in the 
current quarter and in each of the next four quarters, conditional on the 
growth in the current period. The number of respondents has varied 
between 15 and 60 over the quarters. Since our aim in this study is to 
evaluate the SPF probability forecasts at the macro level, we use fore-
casts averaged over individuals. Using the July revisions, during our 
sample period from the fourth quarter of 1968 to the second quarter of 
2004, there were 20 quarters of negative GDP growth spread out over 
six periods, variously beginning in 1969:4, 1973:4, 1980:1, 1981:3, 
1990:3, and 2001:1. These made up six separate episodes of real GDP 
declines. Thus, only about 14 percent of quarters in the entire sample of 
143 quarters exhibited negative GDP growth. The annualized real-time 
real GDP growth issued every July is used as the forecasting target, 
against which the forecasting performance of the SPF forecasts will be 
evaluated.
As noted above, the traditional way of evaluating probability fore-
casts for the occurrence of a binary event is to assess the calibration of 
the forecasts against realizations—that is, to assess the external corre-
spondence between the probability forecasts and the actual occurrence 
of the event. A measure-oriented approach simply compares the fore-
cast probabilities with the realization of a binary event, which is rep-
resented by a dummy variable taking value 1 or 0, depending upon the 
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occurrence of the event. The most commonly used measure is Brier’s 






t xfTQPS  

 ,
where tf  is the forecast probability made at time t, xt is the realization of 
the event (1 if the event occurs and 0 otherwise) at time t, and T is the 
total number of the observations—or forecasting quarters in our case. 
The QPS ranges from 0 to 1, with a score of 0 corresponding to 
perfect accuracy, and is a function only of the difference between the 
assessed probabilities and realizations. The calculated quadratic prob-
ability scores for each forecasting horizon from the current quarter (Q0) 
to the next four quarters (Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4) are calculated to be 
0.077, 0.098, 0.103, 0.124, and 0.127, respectively. Thus, even though 
these scores deteriorate as the forecast horizon increases, all seem to 
suggest good calibration and are close to zero. 
RECEIVER (OR RELATIVE) OPERATING 
CHARACTERISTIC (ROC) 
In evaluating rare event probabilities, it is crucial to minimize the 
impact of the predominant outcome on the outcome score. More spe-
cifi cally, the impact of correctly identifying the frequent event, which 
is the primary source of the hedging, should be minimized. So a better 
approach to forecast performance should concentrate on the hit rate and 
false alarm rate of the infrequent event, instead of the “percentage cor-
rectly predicted” that is the very basis of QPS (Doswell, Davies-Jones, 
and Keller 1990; Murphy 1991).
A simple and often-used measure of forecast skill, the Kuipers score, 
or KS—sometimes referred to as the Pierce skill score—is obtained by 
taking the difference between the hit rate (H) and the false alarm rate 
(F), where H is the proportion of the number of times an event was 
forecast to the number of times it occurred, and F is the proportion of 
the number of times the event was forecast to the number of times it did 
not occur. Given a decision threshold w, the contingency table for suc-
cesses and failures for the event can be written as in Table 3.2. Then the 
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KS can be calculated as  H − F = (ad − bc) / ([a + c] [b + d]). Assuming 
independence of the hit and false alarm rates, the asymptotic standard 
error of the KS is given by
        .[ (1 ) / ( )] [ (1 ) / ( )]H H a c F F b d    
(See Agresti [1996].) Alternatively, based on the market-timing test of 
Pesaran and Timmermann (1992), Granger and Pesaran (2000a,b) have 
suggested an alternative test for the signifi cance of the Kuipers test,
, where .
 
Stephenson (2000) notes that if one of the two elements in a column of 
the contingency table (e.g., d) is very large, then the Kuipers skill score 
effectively disregards the other element (e.g., b) almost completely. 
This can be a limitation of the KS in evaluating rare event forecasts. 
Instead, the forecast skill can better be judged by comparing the 
odds of making a good forecast (a hit) to the odds of making a bad 
forecast (a false alarm)—i.e., by using the odds ratio θ = [H/(1 − H)]/
[F/(1 − F)], which is simply equal to the cross-product ratio (ad)/(bc) 
obtainable from the contingency table. The odds ratio is unity when 
the forecasts and the realizations are independent or KS = 0, and can 
be easily tested for signifi cance by considering the log odds, which are 
approximately normal with a standard error, given by
dcba /1/1/1/1  . 




did not occurEvent forecast Total
Yes a (hit) b (false alarm) a + b 
No c (miss) d (correct 
rejection) 
c + d 
Total a + c b + d a + b + c + d = T
NOTE: T = total number of observations.
SOURCE: Author’s own research.
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Note that each cell count should be at least 5 for the validity of the 
approximation. KS and θ are reported in Table 3.3 for relevant values of 
the decision threshold w. 
One important but often overlooked issue in the evaluation of prob-
ability forecasts is the role of the selected threshold. The performance 
of a probability forecast in terms of discrimination ability is actually 
the result of the combination of the intrinsic discrimination ability of 
a forecasting system and the selection of the threshold. In this regard, 
the receiver (or relative) operating characteristic (ROC) is a convenient 
descriptive approach, but unfortunately has drawn little attention in 
econometrics.6 
The decision to issue a forecast for occurrence or nonoccurrence of 
an event is typically made based on a predetermined threshold (say, w) 
on the weight of evidence scale W. The occurrence forecast is announced 
if W > w; the nonoccurrence is announced otherwise. ROC can be rep-
resented by a graph of the hit rate against the false alarm rate as w var-
ies, with the false alarm rate plotted as the x axis and the hit rate as the 
y axis. The location of the entire curve in the unit square is determined 
by the intrinsic discrimination capacity of the forecasts, and the location 
of specifi c points on a curve is determined by the decision threshold 
w that is selected by the user. As the decision threshold w varies from 
low to high, or the ROC curve moves from right to left, H and F vary 
together to trace out the ROC curve. Low thresholds lead to both high 
H and high F, found toward the upper-right-hand corner. Conversely, 
high thresholds make the ROC points move toward the lower-left-hand 
corner along the curve. Thus, a perfect discrimination is represented 
by an ROC that rises from (0,0) along the y axis to (0,1), then straight 
right to (1,1). The diagonal H = F represents zero skill, indicating that 
the forecasts are completely nondiscriminatory. ROC points below the 
diagonal represent the same level of skill as they would if they were 
located above the diagonal and are merely mislabeled—i.e., a forecast 
of nonoccurrence should be taken as occurrence.
Figures 3.3A–3.3E display the ROC curves, together with their 95 
percent confi dence intervals for the current quarter and the next four 
quarters. The confi dence interval was calculated using the formula
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for each w, where za / 2 = z0.025 = 1.96 for a standard normal variate. It can 
be seen that the ROC for the current quarter (Q0) is located maximally 
away from the diagonal towards the left upper corner, demonstrating 
the highest discrimination ability of the SPF forecasts, followed by the 
one-quarter-ahead forecasts. For longer-term forecasts, ROCs become 
rapidly fl atter as the forecasting horizon increases. For the four-quarter-
ahead (Q4) forecasts, the ROC mildly snakes around the diagonal line, 
and the associated confi dence band suggests that practically none of the 
values are statistically different from the values on the diagonal line. 
This means that the Q4 forecasts have no skill or discrimination ability 
for any value of the threshold. In situations where the analyst may have 
only a vague idea about the relative costs of type I and type II errors 
(e.g., in the problem of predicting the turning point in a business cycle), 
he or she can pick a comfortable hit rate (or false alarm rate) of choice, 
and the underlying ROC curve will give the corresponding false alarm 
rate (or hit rate). This will also give an optimal threshold for making 
decisions. When the relative costs of the two types of errors are known 
exactly, the decision-theoretic framework developed by Zellner, Hong, 
and Min (1991) and Granger and Pesaran (2000a,b) can be used to issue 
recession signals. However, before using the probability forecasts in 
decision making, the signifi cance of their skillfulness should fi rst be 
established. 
The hit rates and false alarm rates for selected threshold values in 
the range 0.50–0.05 are reported in Table 3.3, where one can fi nd the 
mix of hit and false alarm rates that is expected to be associated with 
each horizon-specifi c forecast.7 For example, for achieving a hit rate of 
90 percent with Q0 forecasts, one should use 0.25 as the threshold, and 
the corresponding false alarm rate is expected to be 0.16. Table 3.3 also 
shows that at this threshold value, even though the false alarm rates are 
roughly around 0.15 for forecasts of all horizons, the hit rate steadily 
declines, from 90 percent for Q0 to only 21 percent for Q4. This clearly 
documents the rapid speed of deterioration in forecast capability as the 
forecast horizon increases. Though not reported in Table 3.3, for the 
same hit rate of 90 percent, the false alarm rates for Q1–Q4 forecasts 
are 0.189 (w = 0.237), 0.636 (w = 0.13), 0.808 (w = 0.115), and 0.914 
(w = 0.10), respectively. Thus, for the same hit rate, the corresponding 
false alarm rates for Q3–Q4 forecasts are so large (80 percent and 91 
percent, respectively) that they can be considered useless for all practi-
cal purposes, and thus may have very little value in decision making. 
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y axis: Hit rate; x axis: False alarm rate
Panel A: ROC for Q0 ± 95 Percent Band
Panel B: ROC for Q1 ± 95 Percent Band
False alarm rate
Figure 3.3  Trade-Off between Hit Rates and False Alarm Rates at 
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Panel C: ROC for Q2 ± 95 Percent Band











Figure 3.3  (continued)
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In Table 3.3 we have also reported the Kuipers scores (KS) and the 
odds ratios (θ) for selected w. The rapid decline in these values as the 
forecast horizon increases is remarkable, and for Q4 forecasts these val-
ues are close to zero and unity, respectively, suggesting no skill. Using 
the critical value 1.645 for a one-sided normal test at the 5 percent level, 
the KS and θ values were found to be statistically signifi cant for Q0–Q2 
and insignifi cant for Q4 forecasts.8 For Q3 forecasts, there is some con-
fl icting evidence, depending on the tests we use. Based on the standard 
error formula 
       [ (1 ) / ( )] [ (1 ) / ( )]H H a c F F b d    
for KS reported in Agresti (1996), KS values for Q3 were insignifi -
cant at the 5 percent level for all allowable values of w. However, the 
Pesaran-Timmermann (PT) test and the test based on the log odds ratio 






NOTE: ROC = receiver (or relative) operating characteristic.
SOURCE: Author’s analysis of SPF data.      
Figure 3.3  (continued)
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for Q3 were statistically signifi cant only for w = 0.25, even at the 1 
percent level. Notwithstanding this result, the weight of our previous 
evidence suggests that Q3 forecasts have very little skill. We should, 
however, emphasize that statistical signifi cance or insignifi cance does 
not mean the forecasts have utility or value in a particular decision-
theoretic context.9 
I fi nd overwhelming evidence that Q0–Q2 forecasts have good 
operating characteristics. Given the relative costs of two types of clas-
sifi cation errors, the end user can choose an appropriate threshold w 
to minimize the total expected cost of misclassifi cation. This type of 
optimal decision rule cannot be obtained by only studying QPS. More 
importantly, for forecasting relatively rare events like recessions, ROC 
and odds ratios are useful for making sure that the probability forecasts 
have operational value. This is because, in this approach, the success 
rate in predicting the predominant event is not part of the goodness of 
fi t measure. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter I fi rst report the characteristics of fi xed-target monthly 
GDP growth forecasts for 18 developed countries during the period 
1989–2004. I show how forecasting performance improves as the fore-
cast horizon decreases, and at what horizons forecasts start to become 
informative. Since there are many forecasting organizations around the 
world that provide forecasts for many macroeconomic variables, with 
horizons of up to 12 quarters or more, it is interesting to explore the 
value of these forecasts and thereby try to understand the limits to how 
far ahead today’s professional forecasters can reasonably predict these 
variables. Since the panel of forecasters in Consensus Economics Inc. 
are all private-market professionals, the limits to forecasting that these 
professionals exhibit can safely be taken as indicative of the current 
state of economic forecasting. I fi nd wide diversity in the quality of 
the forecasts across countries, and in the horizons at which forecasts 
start becoming useful—possibly refl ecting the forecast diffi culty of the 
underlying series.
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44  Table 3.3  Measures of Forecast Skill: Quarter 0 to Quarter 4
Q0  Q1 Q2  Q3 Q4





















0.50 0.55 0.07 0.48 17.57 0.25 0.05 0.20 6.44 0.05 0.03 0.02 1.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 — 0.00 0.00 0.00 —
0.45 0.60 0.07 0.53 19.00 0.30 0.07 0.23 5.38 0.10 0.05 0.05 2.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 — 0.00 0.00 0.00 —
0.40 0.60 0.08 0.52 16.95 0.40 0.08 0.32 7.47 0.10 0.07 0.03 1.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 — 0.00 0.00 0.00 —
0.35 0.70 0.10 0.60 21.58 0.50 0.10 0.40 9.17 0.15 0.07 0.08 2.20 0.00 0.03 −0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 —
0.30 0.85 0.11 0.74 44.12 0.75 0.14 0.61 18.53 0.35 0.11 0.24 4.47 0.10 0.08 0.03 1.37 0.00 0.05 −0.05 0.00
0.25 0.90 0.16 0.74 46.35 0.80 0.18 0.62 18.18 0.50 0.15 0.35 5.72 0.25 0.12 0.13 2.52 0.21 0.16 0.06 1.45
0.20 0.95 0.20 0.75 74.48 0.95 0.25 0.70 58.27 0.70 0.26 0.44 6.77 0.45 0.36 0.09 1.47 0.32 0.43 −0.12 0.61
0.15 1.00 0.23 0.77 — 0.95 0.37 0.58 32.51 0.85 0.53 0.32 5.05 0.80 0.66 0.14 2.08 0.74 0.66 0.07 1.42
0.10 1.00 0.40 0.60 — 1.00 0.66 0.34 — 1.00 0.81 0.19 — 1.00 0.86 0.14 — 0.89 0.93 −0.04 0.63
0.05 1.00 0.68 0.32 — 1.00 0.94 0.06 — 1.00 0.99 0.01 — 1.00 1.00 0.00 — 1.00 1.00 0.00 —
NOTE: w = decision threshold; H = hit rate; F = false alarm rate; — = not defi ned. 
SOURCE: Author’s own research.
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I use Theil’s U-statistic with the lagged GDP growth as the bench-
mark, as well as another measure of predictability recently suggested 
by Diebold and Kilian (2001) with the two-year-ahead forecast as the 
benchmark. In terms of Theil’s U, for only 7 of the 18 countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Norway, and the United States) 
did the initial 24-month-ahead forecasts beat the naive forecast. In terms 
of the worst performance, the Irish, Portuguese, Swiss, and Dutch fore-
casts beat the naive forecast at horizons as late as 10–13 months. 
In terms of the Diebold-Kilian skill measure, I fi nd that for the major-
ity of the countries, the long-term forecasts for up to 18 months are as 
good as the initial 24-month-ahead forecasts. That is, over these longer 
horizons, forecasters do not receive dependable information with which 
to adjust their forecasts systematically. I also observe a similar pattern 
when I look at the horizons at which the survey forecasts beat the naive 
no-change forecast. These fi ndings imply that the survey forecasts do 
not have much value when the horizon goes beyond 18 months or so. 
I then go on to evaluate the subjective probability forecasts for 
real GDP declines during the period 1968–2004, using methodologies 
developed in psychology and meteorology. The SPF records probability 
forecasts for real GDP declines during the current and next four quar-
ters. I fi nd overwhelming evidence that the shorter-run forecasts (Q0–
Q2) possess signifi cant skill. In contrast, Q3 and Q4 forecasts exhibit 
poor performance, as measured by ROC measures. It is clear from my 
analysis that our professional forecasters do not have adequate infor-
mation to forecast GDP declines meaningfully at horizons beyond two 
quarters; they lack relevant discriminatory cues. Since the SPF panel is 
composed of professional economists and business analysts who fore-
cast on the basis of models and informed heuristics, their failure in the 
long-term forecasts may indicate that, at the present time, forecasting 
real GDP growth beyond two quarters may not be possible with rea-
sonable type I and type II errors. Since survey probabilities embody 
important additional information over point forecasts, an analysis of the 
probability forecasts provides us with a unique opportunity to under-
stand the reasons for forecast failures. Our analysis of probability fore-
casts suggests that it is more challenging to predict a GDP decline or a 
recession than quantitative growth rate. This is because in predicting a 
relatively uncommon event like real GDP decline, the time series prop-
erty and the persistence of the series are less useful than forecasting the 
quantitative GDP growth rate. 
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I have emphasized that for forecasting rare events like recessions, 
it is important to examine the ROC curves, where the relative odds for 
the event can be studied in depth. The analysis also helps fi nd an opti-
mum probability threshold for transforming the probability forecasts to 
a binary decision rule. In many instances the selection of the threshold 
is quite arbitrary. In this regard, ROC analysis provides a simple but an 
objective criterion, incorporating the end user’s loss function for missed 
signals and false alarms. The ROC analysis in our case reveals that for a 
preassigned hit rate of, say, 90 percent, the associated false alarm rates 
for the Q3–Q4 forecasts are so high that they may be considered useless 
for all practical purposes. 
One wonders if the professional forecasters can be trained to do 
better. In the current situation, forecasting improvement may not be 
possible for various reasons. In most psychological and Bayesian learn-
ing experiments, the outcomes are readily available and are known with 
certainty; thus, prompt feedback for the purpose of improvement is pos-
sible. In contrast, the GDP fi gures are announced with considerable lag 
time, and are then revised repeatedly. Also, as I have mentioned before, 
correct and dependable cues for predicting recessions a few quarters 
ahead may not be available to economists. The excess variability of 
forecasts and the observed lack of discriminating ability may just be 
a refl ection of that hard reality. It may be the same reason that model-
based forecasts over business-cycle frequencies have not succeeded in 
the past. 
Finally, I should point out that the relative inferiority of real GDP 
forecasts can also be determined by the demand side of the forecasting 
market—i.e., the professional forecasters may devote more efforts to 
generating better forecasts if their clients demand that. It is interesting 
that as part of the Fed’s major changes in its communication strategies, 
which took effect in September 2007, the horizon of the projections for 
GDP growth and infl ation by all FOMC members has been extended 
from two years to three.10 As I report earlier in this chapter, currently the 
real GDP growth forecasts do not seem to have any value beyond the 
18-month horizon. If the demand side of the forecasting market has any 
effect on forecast quality, we may expect that, as a result of this change 
in FOMC policy, the content horizon for these forecasts will lengthen 
in the future. 
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Notes
 1. See Isiklar and Lahiri (2007) and Isiklar, Lahiri, and Loungani (2006) for further 
details on the data. 
 2.  Galbraith and Tkacz (2007) have, however, found that forecast horizons do not 
improve even when dynamic factor models with many predictors are used in place 
of simple univariate autoregressive models.
 3.  Notable exceptions include Braun and Yaniv (1992), Graham (1996), Lahiri and 
Wang (2006), and Stock and Watson (2003). However, these studies emphasized 
different aspects of the data. More recently, Clements (2009) has studied the rela-
tionship between intrapersonal uncertainty and interpersonal disagreement in 
these forecasts. Details of this data set are described in Lahiri and Wang (2008). 
 4.  See Doswell, Davies-Jones, and Keller (1990), Lahiri and Wang (2006), Murphy 
(1991), and Stephenson (2000) for more discussion on this issue. 
 5.  See Croushore (1993) for an introduction to the SPF. 
 6.  This approach has a long history in medical imaging, and has also been used 
in evaluating loan default and rating forecasts (Hanley and McNeil 1982; Stein 
2005). See Jolliffe and Stephenson (2003), Stephenson (2000), and Swets and 
Pickett (1982) for additional analysis of the use of ROC. 
 7.  In order to save space, we did not report in Table 3.3 the values of w greater than 
0.5. Moreover, these values were less relevant in our context.
 8.  Note that the cell counts were in excess of 5 only in cases of w values (0.50–0.35) 
for Q0, (0.45–0.35) for Q1, (0.30–0.20) for Q2, (0.25–0.20) for Q3, and (0.20–
0.15) for Q4. The signifi cance tests were conducted only for these cases. 
 9. Granger and Pesaran (2000a) show how, under certain simplifying assumptions, 
the Kuipers score can be used as an indicator of economic value. 
 10.  See Bernanke (2007). 
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